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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction to the study 
“As a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court 
should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials 
before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of the national 
institutions, would be a major success” 
 
Luis Moreno Ocampo 1 
 
 
The coming into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereafter “Rome 
Statute”) in July 20022 was a thriving success for the international community insofar as that it 
contributed greatly to international criminal law jurisprudence.
3  
The Rome Statute establishes 
the International Criminal Court (hereafter “ICC”)4 and confers upon the ICC jurisdiction over 
the international crimes namely: the crime of Genocide; Crimes against Humanity; War Crimes 
and the Crime of Aggression.
5
 However, the execution of the Courts mandate is rather based two 
core principles that the Court operates on: the Principle of Complementarity,
6
 and the Principle 
of Cooperation.
7
 The principle of complementarity is to the effect that the jurisdiction of the ICC 
to prosecute those most responsible for committing international core crimes is subsidiary to that 
of national jurisdictions.
8
 States are therefore expected to undertake the primary responsibility to 
                                                     
1
 Chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (2003) Statement made at the ceremony for the solemn 
undertaking of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. 
2
 See Rome Statute Treaty. 
3
 Schabas (2010: 22-3).  
4
 Rome Statute, Art. 1. 
5
 Rome Statute, Art. 5. 
6
 Rome Statute, Preamble, para 10, Art 1 and 17. 
7
 Rome Statute, Chapter 9. 
8
 Werle (2009: 81 marginal n 222). The author states that, to the ICC, indirect enforcement of international criminal 
law through national prosecution will continue to be of pre-eminent importance. 
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prosecute and punish perpetrators of these crimes.
9
 Conversely, the principle of cooperation 
between the ICC and States Parties will arise after the Court has determined that it has 
jurisdiction over a case. States Parties shall in accordance to the provisions of the Statute 
cooperate fully with the ICC in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court.
10
 Therefore, a State that ratifies the Rome Statute accepts to fulfil these 
requirements created by the Rome Statute. It is not an excuse for a State to plead the national 
legislation as a defence not to perform according to the provisions of the Rome Statute.
11
 Uganda 
a State Party to the ICC is among states that opted to domesticate a Rome Statute implementing 
legislation. It is on this stand point that the study seeks to examine the progress and challenges of 
implementing the Rome Statute in Uganda with focus on compliance with the principle of 
complementarity.  
1.2 Background to the topic of this study 
Uganda was one of the ratifying States
12
 that brought the Statute into force in July, 2002. 
Ratification was an indication of Uganda‟s commitment to the journey to end impunity.13 
The genesis of Uganda‟s commitment to the ICC process could be trailed from the civil 
strife, which plagued the country since obtaining independence in 1962. From the very outset, 
independence was marked by unstable government. Since independence, Uganda has undergone 
frequent regime change, mainly through Coup d’etats,14 which was characterised by gross human 
rights violations. Besides the erratic form of governance since 1986, a long-standing war had 
                                                     
9
 Rome Statute, Preamble, Para 4 and 6. Also see Werle (2009: 82-83) on complementarity model of the ICC. 
10
 Rome Statute, Art. 86. 
11
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art. 27. 
12
 Uganda signed on 17 March, 1999 and deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute on 14 June, 
2002 available http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/African+States/Uganda.htm (accessed 12 March, 
2012). 
13
 Rome Statute, Preamble para. 5. 
14
  Mbazira (2011: 199-200).        
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been raging in Greater Northern Uganda
15
 between the Government of Uganda and the Lord‟s 
Resistance Army (LRA), rebel group led by Joseph Kony. This conflict lasted longer than others. 
The conflict with the LRA has been particularly brutal, with countless incidents of gross human 
rights violations, which constitute international crimes.
16
  
Efforts to bring the conflict to an end were in vain. The Uganda‟s people‟s Defence 
Forces (UPDF) tried to annihilate the LRA, but failed.
17
 The Government then offered the rebels 
a blanket amnesty,
18
 an offer which Kony and his cohorts have rejected.
19
 
All the above efforts having failed, Uganda, a States Party to the Rome Statute, invoked 
article 13(a) of the Rome Statute to refer its Situation to the ICC in December 2003, through a 
letter by the Head of State, President Museveni, inviting the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis 
Moreno Ocampo to investigate the situation in Greater Northern Uganda and parts of Western 
Uganda as of 1 July, 2002.
20
 In May 2004, the government submitted a letter of ceding 
jurisdiction, expressing its inability, inter alia, to conduct proceedings in relation to the persons 
of the LRA allegedly most responsible for the perpetration of the international crimes.
21
  
On 14 October, 2005, the Prosecutor of the ICC concluded that there was reasonable 
evidence to establish that war crimes and crimes against humanity as prescribed by article 5 of 
                                                     
15
 Greater Northern Uganda encompasses the geographical areas of Acholi-Sub-region, Lango sub-Region, Teso 
Sub-region and parts of the West Nile. 
16
 Mbazira (2011: 201-203). See arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court for Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti,     
Domnic Ogwen, Okot Odhiambo and Raska Lukwiya ICC-02/04-01/05.  
17
 Mbazira (2011: 202). 
18
 Uganda‟s Amnesty Act, Cap 294 Laws of Uganda (2000). 
19
 See the case of Uganda v Thomas Kwoyelo Constitutional Petition (reference) No. 36/2011(Unreported), affidavit 
by the respondent in support of the reference Paragraphs 17-21; also see The Republic of Uganda: Amnesty 
Commission-Report: Rebel Group Percentages August (2011), indicates that number of reporters granted amnesty 
from the Lord‟s Resistance Army are 12,906. 
20
 available at                http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/president%20of%20ugand
a%20refers%20situation%20concerning%20the%20lord_s%20resistance%20army%20_lra_
%20to%20the%20icc?lan=en-GB (accessed 12 March, 2012).       
21
 Schabas (2010: 179).   
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the Rome Statute had been committed in Greater Northern Uganda. On application to the Pre-
Trial Chamber II for warrants of arrest, the Chamber subsequently issued unsealed warrants for 
five senior leaders of the LRA on 13 October, 2005.
22 
They are currently still at large. 
Against this background, the implementation of the Rome Statute in Uganda becomes, 
inter alia, vital because, first, Uganda has a general obligation to ensure effective prosecution 
and punishment of international crimes. Secondly, Uganda‟s situation before the ICC creates an 
even greater responsibility on Uganda to co-operate with the ICC to bring the case
23
 pending 
before the ICC to a final conclusion. Thirdly, despite the presence of charges before the ICC for 
Joseph Kony and his cohorts, Uganda is expected to proceed with national prosecutions of other 
low level perpetrators for the atrocities of international concern committed during the conflict. 
This is derived from the precept of complementarity. This is therefore, possible only if Uganda‟s 
legal system can allow for the effective and efficient prosecution and punishment of international 
core crimes.  
1.3 Justification and objective of the study 
Two core reasons justify this study. First, Uganda as a State Party to the Rome Statute has 
obligations. Secondly, despite the fact that Uganda was the first situation before the ICC, 
prospects for trial for the indicted LRA remain in limbo because the perpetrators remain at large. 
Uganda is nevertheless expected to meet her obligations under the Rome Statute to allow for 
punishment of other perpetrators of the LRA conflict.
24
 Subsequent to the above events, Uganda 
has since experienced developments in the field of international criminal justice.  Uganda has 
                                                     
22
 The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and Raska Lukwiya (the latter 
has since been declared by the ICC to be deceased) ICC-02/04-01/05. 
23
 The prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al ICC-02/04-01/05. 
24
 See discussion in Sec 1.1 above on complementarity. 
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instituted both legislative and institutional framework to facilitate punishment of international 
core crimes. In 2008 a special division of the High Court, the International Crimes Division ICD 
was established, 
25
 whose mandate is to try international crimes among others, genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.
26
 Further, in 2010, Uganda domesticated the International 
Criminal Court Act, 2010, whose future application with regards to prosecution of international 
crimes will be subject to the International Crimes Division. 
Therefore, the study objective has been to examine the progress and challenges of 
implementing the Rome Statute in Uganda. The study examines what extent the substantive 
provisions of the Rome Statute are implemented by  the International Criminal Court Act. What 
are the challenges affecting implementation?     
1.4 Literature survey 
There is available literature on the concept of implementation of the Rome Statute. The literature 
is widely presented in light of the core principles of the Rome Statute; the principle of 
complementarity and co-operation. Bellelli,
27
 in discussing the duty to implement states that the 
comprehensive legal system established by the Rome Statute on both the substantive criminal 
law and co-operation provisions is unavoidable. He therefore states that the absence in domestic 
criminal law systems under the statute would raise the issue of admissibility under Article 17 of 
                                                     
25
 High Court (International Crimes Division) Practice Directions Legal notices supplement 5-Legal Notice No. 10 
of 2011; The Uganda Gazette No. 38 Volume CIV dated 31
st
 May, 2011. Its expeditous establishment in 2008 
was a way of fulfilling the Government of Uganda‟s commitment to the actualisation of Juba Agreement on 
Accountability and Reconciliation of 2007 and its annexure-Agenda Item No. 3. Both documents in their 
lamentation provisions recall the complementarity principle of the Rome Statute and make mention of the need 
to set up formal institutions to ensure justice and reconciliation.  
26
 Sec. 6. 
27
 See Bellelli (2010: 212). Also see, The International Centre for Criminal law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy: 
Manual for the ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute (2008). 
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the Rome Statute and thereby the ICC invoking complementarity jurisdiction. Werle,
28
 highlights 
the options for implementation of substantive criminal law by states, available to states. States 
may choose to incorporate or not incorporate provisions of the Rome Statute and use ordinary 
law. However, for the latter, Schabas
29
 establishes that a state must implement the crimes as they 
are spelled out in the Rome Statute. That it is not enough for states to prosecute the underlying 
ordinary crime.  
Other works on implementation establish a standard checklist for determining measures 
for effective implementation of the Rome Statute. Amnesty International‟s30 comprehensive 
checklist points to indicators to be considered for implementation of both complementarity and 
co-operation by states. That for complementarity, states should look at defining crimes, 
principles of criminal responsibility, defences, elimination of bars to prosecution and ensuring 
fair trials without the death penalty. 
Further literature lies in the different analyses on implementation of the Rome Statute 
with regards to the domestic legal framework. This has been carried for both states that have on 
one hand, made changes to their domestic legal system to accommodate the Rome Statute 
31
 and 
those that have not.
32
  
All this literature has been vital in guiding the approach to study. This paper therefore 
embraces the concepts in order to come up with the findings. The paper to a great extent hinges 
on the ICC Act, supported by other Ugandan domestic laws so as to achieve the objective of the 
study. 
                                                     
28
 Werle (2009:  119-122). 
29
 Schabas (2010: 181-182). 
30
 See Amnesty International checklist for the Rome Statute implementation (2000). 
31
 See Werle and Jessberger (2002). 
32
 See Nkhata M (2010: 2770-302) and Marco Roscini (2007). 
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1.5 Research methodology and scope 
The study has applied both primary and secondary sources of literature obtained through the use 
of: desk review, library based research and a phone interview. The primary sources relied on 
include international treaties, agreements, cases, hansard and reports. Secondary sources have 
been obtained from, inter alia books, thesis, journals and working papers.  
However, this methodology applied had its limitations, for example, the nature of 
information retrieved from the internet, for instance, cases from Uganda could not allow for 
proficient citation of lines, paragraphs or pages of  a particular extract in a decision. 
The study applied a unilateral approach. Therefore the study confined the analysis and findings 
to Uganda. 
1.6 Preliminary Chapter overview  
The research paper is laid out in five chapters. Chapter one states the introduction and 
background to the topic of study. Chapter two examines the legal concept of implementation of 
international criminal law in municipal law by establishing conceptual course for implementation 
from the theories of monism, dualism and co-ordination to options for incorporation to be 
considered by a State. Chapter three basically looks the relationship between international law 
and Uganda‟s legal framework and how the former integrates into Uganda‟s legal framework. 
Chapter four is the main subject of the paper and makes a feasibility study on the progress and 
challenges of implementing the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC in light if 
the International Criminal Court Act. Chapter five bears the conclusion to the study and offers 
possible recommendations for the challenges to implementation realised in the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF IMPLEMENTATION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW 
1.2 Introductory remarks 
Legal theory suggests that each state is sovereign and equal.
33
 International law is therefore 
founded on the consent of states, illustrated by legally binding rules: custom and treaty.
34
 These 
binding rules to be given force of law, States tend to make legal and regulatory changes to allow 
the State to act in accordance with international obligations.
35
 However, implementation of these 
binding rules varies among states, depending on the domestic legal system and treaty. 
This chapter, therefore, examines the concept of implementation by defining 
implementation, addressing the monist and dualist concept of implementation of international 
law into domestic law, implementation in international criminal law and features of 
implementation in the domestic sphere. 
2.2 Implementation defined  
Implementation comes from the verb “to implement”, which means to ensure that what has been 
planned is done.
36
 Implementation has been defined as the process of bringing any piece of 
legislation into force.
 37
 Shihata,
38
 in stretching the definition from the immediate, states that a 
wider scope of implementation of an international agreement is therefore meant to encompass all 
                                                     
33
 Shaw (2008:129). Also see Cassese (2005: 153-5). 
34
 Shaw (2008:131). 
35
 International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (2008: 12).  
36
 Collins Cobuild Advanced Dictionary of English (2009). Cf. Humphrey(1978-1979: 34). The author quotes the  
Oxford Dictionary (1933) definition to “implement”, which is said to mean to “complete, perform, to carry into 
effect” 
37
 The Oxford Dictionary of Law (2003: 442). 
38
 Shihata (1996-1997: 37). 
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actions required to carry out commitment resulting from agreements. This would suggest 
implementation not only by enactment of legislation, but also implementation/enforcement of the 
provisions of the implemented legislation. However, Humphrey,
39
 in defining implementation, 
distinguishes between implementation and enforcement. He states that the latter is peremptory. 
Shihata
40
 states that enforcement is a more restrictive notion. It normally refers to measures 
jointly or unilaterally adopted by a competent authority to ensure respect for such commitments 
if they are not honoured voluntarily in practice. 
In essence, the term implementation is basically a broader term, which not only means 
incorporating the provisions of an international instruments into domestic law, but, 
implementation would also literally mean the act of actually give effect to the enacted law. The 
paper however, focuses on the former with regard to the Rome Statute of the ICC implementing 
legislation in Uganda.    
2.3 Monist and dualist dichotomy: Implementing international law in municipal law 
Traditionally, domestication of international agreements is based on the relationship between 
international law and municipal law elucidated by the dualist and monist theories.
41
 The 
relationship between international law and municipal law is based upon the supremacy of the 
state, and the existence of wide differences between the two functioning orders of monism and 
dualism dichotomy.
42
 Monism and dualism posit that there is a common field in which the 
                                                     
39
 Humphrey (1978-1979: 34). 
40
 Shihata (1996-1997: 37). 
41
 Generally Cassese (2005: 213-216); Shaw (2008: 131-132); Brownlie (2008:31-33). 
42
 Shaw (2008: 131). 
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international and municipal legal orders can operate simultaneously in regard to the same subject 
matter
43
  
The monist school posits that international and municipal law should be viewed as 
manifestations of a single conception of law;
44
 that international law is automatically 
incorporated into municipal law without any need for act of adoption by courts or transformation 
by the legislature.
45
 The monist position is therefore referred to as lending support for the 
doctrine of incorporation,
46
 which holds that international law becomes part of municipal law 
automatically without the need for the interposition of a constitutional ratification procedure.
47
 
Conversely, the dualist approach stresses that the rules of the systems of international law 
and municipal law apply separately and cannot purport to have an effect on, or overrule, the 
other.
48
 This means that the two systems are quite distinct systems of law
49
 and regulate a 
different subject matter.
50
 Shaw,
51
 further states that one expression of the positivist-dualist 
position is the doctrine of transformation, which is based on the precept that, a principle rule of 
international law can only have effect within the domestic jurisdiction when expressly and 
specifically transformed into municipal law by appropriate use of constitutional machinery, such 
as an Act of Parliament. Therefore, international law can then be applied by domestic courts only 
if adopted by such courts or transformed into national law by legislation.
52
  
                                                     
43
 Brownlie (2008: 31). 
44
 Gevers (2011: 22). See Cassese (2005: 213). The author states that the monist approach recorgnises the supremacy    
of the municipal law, which is in contrast with another monist view that recorgnises the primacy of international 
law.  
45
 Dugard (2005: 47). 
46
 Dugard (2005: 47).  
47
 See Shaw (2008: 140 et seq). 
48
 Shaw (2008:131). 
49
 Shaw (2008: 139). 
50
 Brownlie (2008: 31). 
51
 Shaw (2008: 139). 
52
 Dugard (2005: 47). Also see Chapter 3, on the procedure of how Uganda a dualist State, implements international 
law instruments. 
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A departure from monist and dualist theory is the attempt by jurists to embrace the theory 
of co-ordination.
53
 This theory is to the effect that international law and municipal law have a 
common field of operation and that the two systems do not come into conflict since they work in 
different spheres and each is supreme in its own field.
54
 According to Rousseau who asserts the 
primacy of international law, characterises international law is as a law of co-ordination, which 
does not provide for abrogation of internal rules when in conflict with obligations on the 
international plane.
55
 Instead, a state is required to assume its responsibility on the international 
plane.
56
 According to Shaw, this theory is to some extent a modification of the dualist position.
57
 
In conclusion, how a state opts to implement international law will depend on how its 
legal system embraces international law. However, for implementation in the context of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, it has been argued that the theories of monism 
and dualism have proven to be less useful because of among others, the distinct nature of the 
treaty, with its extremely detailed co-operation provisions and a distinctive complementarity 
structure.
58
 In my opinion, such an argument is left to be mooted because there is evidence of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute that have embraced either one of the theories in implementing 
the provisions of the Rome Statute.
59
 
                                                     
53
 Brownlie (2008: 33). 
54
 Brownlie (2008:33). Cf, Shaw (2008: 132). 
55
 Brownlie ( 2008: 33). 
56
 Brownlie (2008: 33). 
57
 Shaw (2008: 132). 
58
 See the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice (2008: 13).  
59
 See Chapter 2, Sec. 2.4.2 for dualist countries Uganda and South Africa incorporation of the Rome Statute. Also 
See Advocates Sans Frontiers (2009: 10-14 et seq)on how Democratic Republic of Congo, a monist State 
implements the Rome statute.  
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2.4 Implementation of international criminal law  
International criminal law is a branch of international law, and is the criminal law of the 
international community.
60
 International criminal law embodies a new quality of international 
law, which is no longer limited to the rules of true interstate matters, but reaches deep into the 
state‟s domestic sphere.61 Since international law makes it the primary responsibility of states to 
punish for international crimes,
62
 the practicability then lies with states making international 
criminal law part of their domestic legal order, which comes through implementation of 
substantive international criminal law that is established in international agreements.  
2.4.1 An insight to implementation under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court 
The post Nuremberg trials era, witnessed adoption of international criminal law treaties. Most of 
these treaties contain express provisions that require a that a member state enact legislation to 
give effect to the substantive criminal law provision of the treaty
63
 Conversely, for the Rome 
Statute, the approach to implementation of provisions of the Statute differs. Although, the Rome 
Statute looks at direct enforcement of prosecuting international crimes as an exception rather 
than a rule,
64
 where, amidst the commission of international crimes, states have the primary duty 
to prosecute,
65
 neither the Rome Statute nor the principle of complementarity require that a State 
                                                     
60
 Zahar (2008: vii). 
61
 Werle (2009: 40 Marginal n 111). 
62
 See  Werle (2009: 68-70). 
63
 Art V of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Art 4 of the Convention Against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Art 4 International  Convention  on  the  
Suppression  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Apartheid. 
64
 Werle (2009: 80-81). The author distinguishes between direct and indirect enforcement; the latter being enforced 
by national courts and the former by international tribunals. In the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, direct 
enforcement is primary. 
65
 Bellelli (2010: 212). 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
Party domesticate the substantive provisions of the Statute by altering their national legislation.
66
 
The Rome Statute posits that implementation of the Statute can be achieved using already 
existing national legislation as long as it can effectively be compliant with the Statute provisions. 
However, Billeli
67
 states that the Statute establishes a comprehensive legal system, such that a 
full implementation through domestic enactment of obligations introduced by the Rome Statute 
regarding substantive criminal law and co-operation is unavoidable. In other words a state must 
implement the crimes as they are spelled out in the Rome Statute.
68
 Werle and Jessberger have 
attributed the wording of the ICC that states should be “willing and able,”69 to regard to the 
quality of domestic legislation insofar as prosecuting the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. This read with the preamble to the Rome Statute, paragraph four, 
which affirms that states must take measures at national level to ensure effective prosecution of 
crimes of international concern, would by implication require that: States Parties to the Rome 
Statute examine their legal framework, adapt in their national laws or enact laws to bring 
national criminal law in line with the Rome Statute. 
2.4.2 Options for implementation of international criminal law 
Whichever the theory of international law, whether monism or dualism that a State embraces, a 
State that chooses to make international criminal law part of its domestic legal order has broad 
options in deciding how to adopt substantive international criminal law.
70
  Werle
71
 identifies the 
                                                     
66
 See Werle and Jessberger (2002: 194); Werle (2009:118 Marginal n 312); Roscini (2007) on the non self 
executing nature of the Rome Statute. Conversely, see the Rome Statute: Art. 70 on the requirement that states 
criminalise offences against the administration of justice, and Part 9, that states must ensure that there are national 
procedures for state co-operation in place. 
67
 Bellelli (2010: 212). 
68
 Schaba (2010L: 181-182). 
69
 Cf. Rome Statute, Art. 17. 
70
 Werle(2009: 119 marginal n 314). 
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options for implementation to include: complete incorporation;
72
 non incorporation by applying 
ordinary criminal law,
73
 modified incorporation
74
 and combinations.
75
 Developments in Uganda 
indicate that in a decision to implement the substantive international criminal law, Uganda opts 
for complete incorporation by copying the substantive criminal law provisions as provided for in 
the respective international criminal law agreements.
76
 This has been so for, incorporation of the 
grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions under the Geneva Conventions Act
77
 and 
incorporation of the Rome Statute crimes under the International Criminal Court Act, 2010.
78
 
Werle, further establishes two forms of legislative incorporation of international criminal law. 
They are either amendment to already existing legislation or codification of a separate law.
79
 The 
trend in Uganda shows that Uganda tends to codify specific legislation to implement respective 
international criminal agreements.
80
 States such as South Africa
81
, Kenya
82
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
71
 See Werle (2009: 116-121) for further elaboration on each of the options. 
72
 See Werle (2009: 119 et seq, marginal n 315-318), for various options for incorporation. They include: direct 
application of customary international law; reference to the ICC Statute; and by copying the provisions of the 
ICC Statute verbatim. 
73
 Werle (2009: 120, marginal n 319-321). 
74
 Werle (2009: 121, marginal n 322). 
75
 Werle (2009: 121, marginal n 323). 
76
 Werle (2009: 1201, marginal n 322). The author states that complete incorporation can occur by adopting the 
offences verbatim into the domestic law. 
77
  Geneva Conventions Act 1964, Cap. 363, Laws of Uganda (2000), Sec. 2. Also See Chapter 4, Secs. 4.4.1.3. 
78
 See Secs 7, 8 and 9. Also See Chapter 4, Secs. 4.4.1.1-4.4.1.3. 
79
 See generally, Werle (2009: 122, marginal ns 325-328). 
80
 See the Geneva Conventions Act and the International Criminal Court Act. 
81
 Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002; Government Gazette, 18 
July 2002. 
82
 International Crimes Act, 2008; available at 
<http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Acts/The_International_Crimes_Act_2008.pdf> (accessed 8 October, 
2012). 
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 2.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has addressed the concept of implementation insofar as giving effect to international 
treaties by states is concerned. That implementation involves how a state makes international law 
part of the domestic law. In narrowing the concept of implementation to the substantive 
provisions of the Rome Statute, the chapter points out the options of incorporation available to 
states. In a nutshell, which ever option is taken, such act can be by the state either amending 
legislation or codifying legislation. This chapter therefore feeds the subsequent chapters on 
implementation of international criminal law in Uganda and the assessment of implementing the 
Rome Statute of the ICC in Uganda. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN UGANDA 
3.1 Introductory remarks 
It is now a settled trend in international criminal law that States have the primary duty to 
prosecute and punish perpetrators of international crimes.
83
 The duty to prosecute creates a need 
for states to make checks and consider accommodating international criminal law in the domestic 
legal system. Uganda is and has been party to a number of international treaties relating to the 
prosecution of international crimes.
84
 Therefore, since Uganda has a duty to prosecute 
international crimes on its territory, the legal basis of international criminal law and its 
application in the domestic legal system must be established. 
The chapter identifies the sources of criminal law in Uganda in attempt to identify the 
legal basis of international criminal law. The chapter also looks into ways of integrating 
international criminal law agreements into the domestic legal system. This informs the next 
chapter insofar as that it gives a picture of the developments in Uganda‟s legal system. This will 
help to shed light on the arguments raised in the next chapter.  
3.2 Sources of criminal law and procedure 
The applied law in Uganda is derived from sources of written and unwritten law. These laws are 
applied in order of precedence. Written law includes: the Constitution, Principal Laws and 
Subsidiary Laws. Unwritten law includes: common law and doctrines of equity, and customs and 
practices.  
                                                     
83
 See Rome Statute, Preamble, para 4 and 6. Also see generally, Werle (2009: Part 1, Section E). 
84
 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977, Rome Statute of the ICC, Protocols to the Great Lakes 
Pact (protocol on Genocide and Protocol on Sexual Violence), Genocide Convention of 1948. 
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3.2.1 The Constitution  
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 (as amended) (hereinafter “Constitution”), is 
the supreme law of Uganda.
85 
 Article 2(2) of the Constitution, further, provides that if any law 
or custom is inconsistent with the Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail and that other law 
or custom shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.
86
 In essence, all laws in Uganda 
derive their authority from the Constitution and must conform to the Constitution.
87
 
 Notably, Chapter 4 of the Constitution contains principles that are to be applied in 
criminal law process. Pertinent is Article 28 on the right of a fair trial that sets out the principles 
of natural justice. This is important because the submission in the subsequent chapter will make 
reference to this provision. 
3.2.2 Principle laws 
Principle laws are enacted by Parliament. Parliament enacts these laws in response to 
implementing constitutional provisions for peace, order, development and good governance of 
the Country.
88
 Principal criminal laws, inter alia, include: the Penal Code Act, Cap. 120; the 
Geneva Conventions Act, Cap. 363; and International Criminal Court Act No. 11/2010. The 
latter two are a product of international criminal law instruments that Uganda ratified and later 
enacted to allow Uganda comply with its respective obligations. 
                                                     
85
  See Constitution, Art. 2 (1). 
86
 Cf. with judgments in Uganda Women Lawyers et al vs Attorney General Constitutional Petition No. 
2/2003(Unreported); Susan Kigula et al vs Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No. 3/06 (SC) (Unreported). 
In both cases, provisions within the principle laws: the Divorce Act Cap. 249 Laws of Uganda and Penal Code 
Act Cap 120 respectively, were challenged as infringing on constitutional guarantees. The Court found such 
provisions to be unconstitutional contrary to Article 2(2) of the Constitution. 
87
 See Handbook of Uganda Law Reform Commission (2010: 3) (hereinafter “ULRC handbook”). 
88
 Constitution, Art. 79 (1).  Also see ULRC handbook (2010: 3). 
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3.2.3 Subsidiary laws 
Subsidiary laws generally implement principal laws and deal with matters of detail and 
procedure.
89
 They are usually meant to implement principle laws. Article 79(2) of the Ugandan 
Constitution restricts the power to make provisions to have force of law in Uganda on certain 
persons.  They are: (a) persons mentioned under the Constitution; (b) members of parliament; 
and (c) persons or bodies authorised by law. Subsidiary legislation includes: statutory 
instruments, ordinances, by-laws, regulations, rules, or orders.
90
 
3.2.4 Common law and principles of equity 
Common law and principles of equity are considered next in hierarchy to written law.
91
 Common 
law refers to principles of the law of England developed over time through practice and court 
decisions.
92
 Uganda, a former British colony
93
 has adopted and applies these rules. Courts, in 
adjudicating cases, may invoke these principles.  Common law is used in Uganda where the 
subject matter is not covered by statutory law, that is, law made by the law making bodies of 
Uganda.
94
 
The principles of equity refer to values that promote fairness, justice and reasonableness 
in social relations.
95
 Equity was developed to attend to inadequacies in the application of 
common law.
96
  
                                                     
89
 See ULRC handbook (2010: 3). 
90
 See the Criminal Procedure Code Act, Trial on Indictment Act and Evidence Act, subsidiary legislation 
established by Parliament to be applied to guide the process of criminal prosecutions in Uganda. For prosecution 
of international crimes, confer with Para. 8 of the High Court (International Crimes Division) Practice Directions 
2010, which stipulates that the International Crimes Division shall apply rules of procedure and evidence 
applicable to criminal trials in Uganda. 
91
 Sec. 14(2) (i), Judicature Act, Chapter 13, Laws of Uganda 2000.  
92
 ULRC Handbook (2010: 7). 
93
 Uganda obtained Independence from Great Britain on October 9, 1962. 
94
 Judicature Act, Sec.14(2) (ii) and (3). 
95
 ULRC handbook (2010: 3). 
96
 See ULRC handbook (2010: 7). 
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The Judicature Act provides for the concurrent applicability of common law and principles of 
equity. However, in case of conflict, the doctrines of equity shall prevail.
97
  
3.4.5 Custom or usage 
Established custom or usage can be applied in the absence of written law.
98
 This is only to the 
extent that the existing custom is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience 
and not incompatible either directly or by necessary implication with any written law.
99
  
 In as much as this is a recorgnised source of law, it is rare that it would be applied in 
criminal cases because Article 28(12) Constitution provides that one can only be charged for an 
offence if the crime and punishment are defined by law.
100
 
Noteworthy is that custom and usage in this provision do not extend to customary 
international law. The Ugandan Constitution is silent on the application of customary 
international law as a source of law.  
 
3.4.6 Judicial decisions 
Another important organ that makes laws is the judiciary. When a case is decided, it forms part 
of precedence. Courts in Uganda are divided into a two tier system: superior courts of record, 
and subordinate courts.
101
 Courts of record, also known as the courts of precedence include: the 
Supreme Court, which is the highest and final court of appeal; the Court of 
                                                     
97
 Judicature Act, Sec. 14 (4). 
98
 Judicature Act, Sec. 14(2). 
99
 Constitution, Art. 2(2); Judicature Act, Sec. 15. 
100
 See sec. 2.3 on dualist approach on the relationship between international and municipal law. 
101
 See Constitution, Art. 129. Decisions of subordinate courts are not cited as precedent. 
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Appeal/Constitutional Court; and the High Court.
102
 The order of hierarchy dictates the 
precedence in citing the binding decisions. Section 14(2) of the Judicature Act, provides the law 
to be applied by courts in Uganda.
103
 This section lists the sources of law courts that are expected 
to apply in adjudicating matters, and how they are to be applied in order of precedence, as 
discussed in Section 3.2.1-3.4.5 above.  
Decisions from other jurisdictions including international criminal tribunals, may be cited 
by counsel in presentation of a case, but the discretion is upon the Court to embrace the 
respective decisions. Normally, when faced with international law in their midst, the courts will 
prefer to engage domestic sources of law to conclude matters.
104
 The case of Thomas Kwoyelo is 
one in point.
105
 The accused had been charged inter alia, with grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions under the Geneva Conventions Act.
106
 The case, being the first of its kind, before 
the courts with international criminal law dimension, would have probably been the first to 
establish precedent by Ugandan courts on prosecution of international crimes in Uganda had the 
trial not been stopped by the Constitutional Court in favour of granting of amnesty to the 
accused.  
This case, in essence, reveals the reservations Ugandan courts have when the need to 
invoke international law arises. This was a decision made irrespective of the fact that Uganda 
had domesticated the Geneva Conventions. The courts also ignored the fact that the Juba Peace 
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of Uganda and 
                                                     
102
 See Constitution, Chapter 8. Also see parts I, II, and III of Judicature Act. Note that the Court of Appeal can 
convene as a Constitutional Court to hear constitutional matters. 
103
 Chapter 13, Laws of Uganda 2000; Cf. Kabumba (2010: 84). 
104
 See Kabumba (2010: 87-89 et seq). Also see generally Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni, No. 36/11for 
submissions by the Attorney General in favour of international criminal law against Uganda amnesty law, which 
the justices of the Constitutional Court did not adopt. 
105
 See Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni, No. 36/11. 
106
 See Geneva Conventions Act, Sec. 2 and Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni No.36/2011 HCT-100-ICD-
case No. 02/10 (amended indictment). 
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LRA,
107
  recornises the complementarity principle under the Rome statute and therefore, inter 
alia, indicates prosecutions a means through which accountability for the LRA conflict can be 
addressed.
108
  
3.4.7. Conclusion 
One can conclusively state that although the Constitution makes mention of international law and 
treaty obligations in Uganda,
109
 it is silent on the position of international law as a source of 
law.
110
 From the discussion, however, international criminal law as a source of criminal law in 
Uganda seems to be found only in parliamentary enactments as stated in section 3.2.2 above. 
This means that international law does not apply automatically in Uganda‟s legal system. It 
requires to be incorporated by a law of parliament.
111
 
3.5 Requirements for the implementation of international conventions and treaties in 
Uganda 
3.5.1 Convention and treaty ratification process 
For both monist and dualist states, implementation of international law provisions starts right 
from ratification or accession of a treaty. It is at this point that other domestic procedures can be 
considered to give effect the respective treaty. This is subject to the rights or obligations created 
under the treaty.
112
 
                                                     
107
 Signed 29
 
June 2007. See preamble para. 3, and Sec. 2. 
108
 See preamble, para. 3, and Sec. 2. 
109
 See Constitution, National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy XXVIII (i)(b) states that the 
foreign policy of Uganda shall be based on, among other things, respect for international law and treaty 
obligations. 
110
 Judicature Act, Sec. 14 (2). 
111
 See Chapter 2 on the concept of implementation. 
112 See, Art. 2(1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (hereafter Vienna Convention) refers 
to “ratification”, “acceptance”, “approval” and “accession” to mean in each case, the international act whereby a 
State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty. Cf. with Article 14 of the 
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The process of incorporation of an international legal instrument in Uganda begins with 
the procedure to be followed in the event of ratification of treaties as laid down in the 
Ratification of Treaties Act
113
 (“Act”), and Article 123(1) of the Ugandan Constitution. Under 
Article 123(1), the President or a person authorised by the President reserve the right to make 
treaties, conventions, agreements or other arrangements between Uganda and any other country 
or between Uganda and any international organisation or body, in respect of any matter. Article 
123(2) therefore, tasks parliament to make laws to govern ratification of treaties, conventions, 
agreements or other arrangements made under clause (1) above. 
Consequent to Article 123(1) and (2) of the Constitution, Section 2 of the Act provides 
for a two level process of ratification by Cabinet and by Parliament. Section 2(a) empowers 
Cabinet to ratify any treaty other than a treaty that shall be ratified by Parliament. Section 2(b) 
provides for treaties to be ratified by parliament by resolution. This is in the event that the treaty 
relates to armistice, neutrality or peace; or in the case of a treaty in respect of which the Attorney 
General has certified in writing that its implementation in Uganda would require an amendment 
of the Constitution. Irrespective of whether ratification is by Cabinet or Parliament, the 
instrument of ratification of treaty shall be signed, sealed and deposited by the Minister 
responsible for foreign affairs.
114
     
                                                                                                                                                                           
Convention, which states that consent to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification, acceptance or 
approval. 
113
 Cap 204, Laws of Uganda (2000), The Act defines “treaty” to include a convention, agreement or other 
arrangement made under article 123(1) of the Constitution. 
114
 Sec. 3, Ratification of Treaties Act. 
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3.5.2 Domestic implementation of conventional or treaty law 
Uganda, a common law State
115
, maintains the dualist approach of incorporating international 
law.
116
 Therefore, valid ratification of conventions and treaties does not guarantee that the 
respective international instrument has automatic force of law in the domestic legal order.
117
  For 
the instrument to be considered to have force of law, it must be codified as part of Uganda‟s 
written law. Domestic implementation of a treaty is the reserve of a law-making authority, which 
is Parliament. Parliament is the primary legislative arm of government vested with the power to 
make law in Uganda.
118
 Article 79 (2) of the Constitution strictly confers upon Parliament 
powers to make provisions having force of law in Uganda. An intended law is therefore, 
introduced to Parliament in the form of a Bill, which will then go through the process of 
enactment of laws as prescribed under the Rules and Procedure of Parliament.
119
 After 
Parliament has passed a law, it remains dormant until it is assented to by the president and 
gazetted for it to have effect.
120
 
 
                                                     
115
 Uganda gained independence from Great Britain on 9 October 1962. See Cassese (2005: 214) on Britain‟s 
adoption of the dualist approach of international rules and treaties. 
116
 See Shelton (2011: 595). 
117
 See Chapter 2, Sec. 2.3 above. 
118
 See Art. 79 (1), Constitution provides that Parliament shall have the power to make laws on any matter for the 
peace, order, development and good governance of Uganda. 
119
 Rules and Procedure for Parliament of Uganda, June 2006, Rules 99-121. 
120
 Decision of Mulenga in Attorney General vs Paul K. Ssemogerere and anor, SC. Constitutional Appeal no. 3 of 
2004. Para 9.  Also see dictum in Attorney General vs. Dr. James Rwanyarare and Other, Constitutional Appeal 
No.2/03, where the court in tackling the provisions of section 14(1) and (2) of the Acts of Parliament Act, 
(Cap.2) concerning commencement of an Act of Parliament, concluded that  
“Clearly according to those provisions an Act of Parliament... becomes a law when it is assented to by the 
President. However, we understand subsection (2) to imply that a law remains dormant until the day upon which 
it becomes enforceable and that day is the date of commencement.”  
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3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter establishes that Uganda, a state that has embraced the dualist approach, has legal 
processes through which international law becomes part of the domestic law. International 
treaties, like the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, went through the domestic legislative process to have the force of law.
121
 Therefore, 
international criminal law In Uganda is contained in the respective parliamentary enactments.  
Also established is that, Uganda‟s decision to implement international instruments 
happens only after ratification.
122
 However, it must be noted that the domestication of 
international criminal law into principal legislation does not necessarily mean that international 
law provision will reign supreme. The Constitution still remains a determining factor in the 
success of the application of rules of international law.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
121
 See Geneva Conventions Act, Cap. 36, and the International Criminal Court Act 200; Act 11/2010 respectively. 
122
 See International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (Manual) (2008: 13), on the 
contrary practice of Australia a dualist State whose Constitutional requires that a comprehensive implementing 
legislation needs to first be prepared before an international treaty can be ratified or acceded to. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATING OF THE ROME STATUTE 
OF THE ICC IN UGANDA 
4.1 Introductory Remarks 
The implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC by States Parties is the most vital step for 
combating impunity on a world-wide scale. Uganda, in bid to fulfil its obligations under the 
Rome Statute, has enacted the International Criminal Court Act, 2010 (hereafter “ICC Act”),123 
which comprehensively addresses both the principles of complementarity and co-operation. 
However, this chapter limits the discussion to complementarity, namely implementation 
of the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute. The paper adopts this in the light of the 
enacted Uganda ICC Act by placing it as the main piece of legislation that gives effect to the 
Rome Statute. But one needs to take a critical look at what the challenges are that lie in the way 
to a successful implementation.  
4.2 Embracing international criminal justice in Uganda- Enacting the International 
Criminal Court Act, 2010 
The attempt to domesticate the ICC Act began in 2004. But the process was delayed because the 
draft Bills turned out to exhibit major inconsistencies when considered against the contents of 
existing domestic laws.
124
 Also there were ongoing peace negotiations between the Government 
of Uganda (hereafter “Government”) and the Lord‟s Resistance Army125 as well as the then 
                                                     
123
 ICC Act, No. 11/2010; Uganda Gazette No. 39 Volume CIII dated 25
th
 June, 2010. 
124
 Parliament of Uganda- Hansard (Wednesday 10 March 2010) at p 6-7, observations made by the Committee on 
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs on, inter alia, question of the death penalty and immunity. 
125
 Parliament of Uganda- Hansards of (Thursday 26 May 2005) at p16 and (Wednesday 10 March 2010) at p18. 
See, Panos Eastern Africa (2010) at p 8-9) Human Rights and Peace Building: A media toolkit for journalists, 
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existing amnesty law.
126
 These reasons where confirmed by the Chairperson of the Committee on 
Legal and Parliamentary affairs, Hon. Stephen Tashobya.
127
  
 Between 2004 and 2010, two draft Bills were tabled before Parliament. The first Bill was 
the “International Criminal Court Bill”, 10/2004,128 tabled before Parliament for first reading on 
24 June 2004. It lapsed with the seventh parliamentary period and was not passed.
129
 In 
December 2006, the government tabled a new draft Bill entitled “International Criminal Court 
Bill, 18/2006” (hereafter “ICC Bill”).130 Even then it took the Committee on Legal and 
Parliamentary Affairs (hereafter “the Committee”) three and a half years to come up with a draft 
report.
131
 The findings of the report on the ICC Bill were presented by the Committee on 10 
March 2010.
132
  The Committee highlighted the legal issues within the Bill for consideration by 
Parliament.
133
 On 10 March 2010, the ICC Bill went through a momentous second and third 
reading, and the Parliament enacted the International Criminal Court Act.
134
 It was has been said 
that Uganda‟s bid to host the Rome Statute of the ICC Review Conference is what re-ignited and 
fast-tracked the process of the enactment of the ICC Act.
135
 This is because the expeditious 
enactment of the ICC Act happened two months prior to Uganda‟s hosting of the Review 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Kampala: Panos Eastern Africa. Also see the Juba Agenda Items No. 1, 2,3,4,5 and 6 Agreements (2006-2008); 
available at <http://www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/peace_agreements.php> (accessed 27 September 2012). 
126
 Amnesty Act, Cap. 294. 
127
 Telephone interview which the author conducted with Hon. Stephan Tashobya, Hon. Member of Parliament-
Uganda on Wednesday 24 October 2012 at 09:25am. Also refer to Rules and Procedure of Parliament of Uganda, 
June 2006, Rule 113 on the role of the Committee with regard to Bills. 
128
 Parliament of Uganda- Hansard (Thursday 24 June 2004) at p 3.  
129
 See comment of the Deputy Attorney General, Parliament of Uganda- Hansard (Wednesday 10 March 2010) at p 
18. Also, Chairman of the Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Hon. Stephen Tashobya, stated that 
the 2004 ICC Bill was withdrawn by government because it contained fundermental defects (Refer to phone 
interview 24
 
October, 2012 at 9:25am in note 115 above). 
130
 Parliament of Uganda– Hansard (Tuesday, 05 December 2006) at p 3. 
131
 Parliament of Uganda- Hansard (Wednesday 10 March 2010), comment of the Deputy Attorney General at p17. 
132
 Report of the Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs on the International Criminal Court Bill, 2006 
(2010) at p 2-3. Also see Parliament of Uganda– Hansard (Wednesday, 10 March 2010) at p 6-7. 
133
 Parliament of Uganda-Hansard (Wednesday, 10 March 2010) at p 6-7. 
134
 Parliament of Uganda-Hansard (Wednesday, 10 March 2010) at p 55. 
135
 Otim and Wierda (2010: 4). 
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Conference.
136
 The ICC Act was then assented to by the President on 25 May 2010,
137
 five days 
before the Review Conference took place. The Act took effect on 25 June, 2010.
138
 
4.3 Introducing the International Criminal Court Act 
The preamble to the Act provides that, 
“An Act to give effect to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; to 
provide for offences under the laws of Uganda corresponding to offences within the 
jurisdiction of the court; and for connected matters.”139  
 
Section 2 highlights the purpose of the Act, which is, inter alia, to give the ICC Act force of law 
in Uganda and to implement obligations assumed by Uganda under the Rome Statute.
140
 In a 
nutshell, Section 2 provides for the purpose of the Act as being to facilitate the principles of 
complementarity
141
 and co-operation.
142
  Whereas the former concerns itself with making it 
possible for Ugandan courts to punish the international core crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, and the offences against the administration of justice,
143 
the latter 
concerns itself with different procedure with respect to different forms of cooperation between 
the ICC and Uganda.
 144
  
 Embedded schedules to the Act are the Rome Statute
145
 and the Agreement on 
Privileges and Immunities of the ICC (APIC).
146
 Cross references of the ICC Act with respective 
                                                     
136
 The Review Conference was held in Kampala, Uganda, from 31 May to 11 June, 2010. Confirm at  
     <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ReviewConference/> (accessed 25 October 2012). 
137
 See ICC Act at p 6. 
138
 See ICC Act at p 6. 
139
 ICC Act, preamble. 
140
 ICC Act, Sec 2 (a) and (b). 
141
 ICC Act, Sec 2 (c) and (g). 
142
 ICC Act, Sec 2 (d-f) and (h-i). 
143
 See ICC Act (Part II–Secs 7-19). 
144
 See ICC Act, Requests for assistance (Part III-Secs 20-25); Arrest and surrender of persons to the ICC (Part IV–
Secs 26-42); Domestic procedures for other types of co-operation (Part V–Secs 43-63); Enforcement of penalties 
(Part VI–Secs 64-80); Protection of national security/third party information (Part VII–Secs 81-89); 
Investigations or sittings of the ICC in Uganda (Part VIII–Secs 90-96); Requests for assistance (to the ICC) (Part 
IX–Secs 97-99); Miscellaneous (Part–Secs 100-102). 
145
 ICC Act, Schedule I. 
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domestic laws are provided for at the end of the sections to the Act.
147
 The effect is that, unless 
otherwise stipulated, the ICC Act is to be read in harmony with the referenced laws. 
4.4 Defining and prosecuting international crimes in Uganda 
The ICC regime came with a formal identification of international core crimes by the 
international community namely: genocide; war crimes; crimes against humanity; and 
aggression.
148
 Due to their universal nature, it follows that these crimes, when committed, affect 
the international community as a whole.
149
 States are therefore encouraged to attach primacy to 
the investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators of these crimes.
150
 In doing so, states must 
implement crimes as they are spelled out in the Rome Statute.
151
 Prosecuting underlying ordinary 
crimes is not enough.
152
 
4.4.1 International crimes defined 
Section 2 (c) of the ICC Act, provides that the purpose of the Act is to make provision in 
Uganda‟s law for punishment of the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. These have been prescribed under sections 7, 8 and 9, respectively, of the Act. 
The Act does not give force to the crime of aggression.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
146
 ICC Act, Schedule 2. There exists an Agreement on Privileges and Immunities (APIC)
 
between the ICC and 
Uganda, signed on 7 April 2004 and ratified the agreement on 21 January, 2009. APIC Article 3 generally 
provides that ICC shall enjoy privileges and immunities within the territory of each State party to allow for the 
fulfillment of its purpose. 
147
 See Appendix, The ICC Act.  
148
 Rome Statute, Art. 5. Werle (2009: 29) defines an International Crime as a norm that is part of the body of 
international law that entails individual criminal responsibility and subject to punishment. 
149
 Rome Statute, preamble, paras 4 and 9, Art 5(1). Tomuschat (2002: 332,333 and 340) notes that not all these 
crimes have attained the status of universal jurisdiction. 
150
 Rome Statute, Preamble, para. 10, Art. 1 and 17. 
151
 Schabas (2010: 182-182). 
152
 Schabas (2010: 182). 
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4.4.1.1 Genocide  
The crime of genocide was for the first time formulated in 1948 under Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereafter “Genocide Convention”).153 The 
crime was subsequently reflected in Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal(s) for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Art 4), Rwanda (ICTR) (Art 2) and the Rome Statute (Art 6). The crime has 
since gained the status of customary international law and jus cogens.
154
 
Article 5 of the Genocide Convention requires that States Parties to the Convention 
criminalise genocide. Uganda accessed the Genocide Convention on 14 November 1995.
155
 It 
was however, only after enactment of the ICC Act that the crime of genocide was included as 
part of Uganda‟s domestic law.  
Before enacting the ICC Act, the definition of genocide under the Rome Statute,
156
 would 
have been incapable of allowing for the punishment of Genocide. The rationale behind the crime 
of genocide is to protect specific groups and not an individual.
157
 Protection of national, ethnic, 
racial and religious groups forms part of the material element of the crime of genocide.
158
 The 
                                                     
153
 See the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948.  
 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg did not expressly define the crime of genocide. 
The nature of the crime was considered to have been consumed with in elements-extermination and persecutions 
on political, racial or religious grounds of crimes against humanity. See Werle (2009: 254-255). 
154
 The report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48
th
 Session, 1996, GAOR, 51
st
 Session 
Suppl. No. 10(/51/10).  Also see Dugard (2005: 160). 
155
 Available at 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-
1&Chapter=4&lang=en#Participants> (accessed 30 July 2012). 
156 Rome Statute, Art. 6. Genocide is defined as, any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
157
 Byron, (2004: 151 et seq).  
158
 Werle (2009:258, marginal n 707). 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
Penal Code Act definition of the offences of murder and assaults cannot be said have meaning 
within provisions of Article 6 (a) and (b): to “kill members of a group” or “cause serious bodily 
or mental harm to members of the group” respectively. This is insofar as the special intent to kill 
a group in whole or in part is concerned. Murder is defined to mean, “…any person who causes 
the death of another person…”.159 The definition does not include a special group. Part XXIII of 
the Penal Code Act lists different kinds of assaults. Section 236 on assault causing actual bodily 
harm is what could be close to the definition of Article 6(b). The discussion as to whether 
“causing actual bodily harm” includes serious bodily and mental harm is an aspect to be left for 
further analysis. However, the definitions of these offences fall short of including groups, a 
material element in the definition of genocide. Also to note is that acts prescribed in parts c-d of 
Article 6 can hardly be ascertained under any criminal law provisions.  
The prosecution for the crime of genocide is now possible under Section 7 of the ICC 
Act, which copies the Rome Statute provision on Genocide.  
The ICC Act in defining the scope of the criminal acts of genocide, extends it to include 
the crime of conspiracy.
160
 Section 7(2) establishes individual criminal responsibility for those 
who conspire or agree to commit genocide in Uganda or elsewhere. It is worth noting that t crime 
of conspiracy is not new; it one of the inchoate offences punishable under chapter XLI of the 
Penal Code Act. The Penal Code Act criminalises conspiracy to commit a felony or 
misdemeanour and other forms of conspiracy.
161
 The penalty of conspiracy to commit a felony 
for which genocide would fall is punishable by imprisonment for seven years. But the provision 
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 Penal Code Act, Sec. 188. 
160
ICC Act, Sec. 7 (1) (a) and Sec. 7(2).  
161
 Secs. 390, 391 and 392. 
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allows for other punishment to be applied if provided for.
162
 In this case, Section 7(3) of the ICC 
Act provides for a punishment of life imprisonment or a lesser term. 
4.4.1.2. Crimes against humanity 
Crimes against humanity were first devised in Article 6 of the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The crimes continued to appear in other international 
agreements though with modification and departure from original format of Nuremberg.
163
 
Unlike the crime of genocide and war crimes, crimes against humanity had not been defined in 
any treaty prior to their inclusion in Rome Statute. Nevertheless they have gained customary 
international law status.
164
  
  Like the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity were not part of the Ugandan 
criminal law till the domestication of the ICC Act. The question whether the law as it was before 
the enactment of the ICC Act, would allow for prosecution of crimes against humanity is 
answered in the negative. The strict definition of crimes against humanity, “…any of the acts 
committed as part of a wide spread and systematic attack against a civilian population with 
knowledge of the attack”,165 would not furnish the prosecution under such a context. This is 
irrespective of the fact that some of the predicate offences of the crimes against humanity are 
                                                     
162
 Sec. 390. 
163
 ICTY, Art. 6; ICTR, Art. 5; Rome Statute, Art. 7. 
164
Dugard (2005: 160) quoted from Bassiouni M.C. (1999) “Crimes against humanity in international law” in 
McComack and Simpson G. J (eds) The law of war crimes. Also see the Statutes of the ICTY, Art. 6; ICTR, Art. 
5; ICC, Art. 7 that reaffirm the customary law status of crimes against humanity. 
165
 Rome Statute, Art. 7(1). Also see Rome Statute Art 30 for mental element, “intent and knowledge.”  
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crimes under the domestic law,
166
 while some others have been recorgnised as guaranteed human 
rights under the Constitution.
167
 
Section 8(2) of the ICC Act, therefore, introduces crimes against humanity as a novel crime 
in Uganda‟s domestic system. The section incorporates completely the definition of crimes 
against humanity as stipulated under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.
168
 However, the new 
offences and terms, inter alia, include: Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity 
on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender; extermination; deportation or 
forcible transfer of population; apartheid, and some of the sexual crimes like enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, have not been visible in Uganda‟s criminal 
law. 
4.4.1.3 War crimes  
The term war crime is used to describe crimes committed under international law in connection 
with an armed conflict, even if the individual case involves crimes against humanity or 
genocide.
169
 A war crime is a violation of a rule of international humanitarian law that creates 
criminal responsibility under international law.
170
 Following their codification in the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
171
 they were later included in the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. 
Prior to the enactment of the ICC Act, war crimes were punishable under the Ugandan 
criminal law. Uganda had in 1964 passed the Geneva Conventions Act (hereafter “GCA”). 
                                                     
166
 Penal Code Act, murder (Section 188 and 189) and Rape (123 and 124).  
167
 Constitution, Art. 23 on protection of personal liberty, Art 24 on prohibition form any form of torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” and Art 25 on protection from slavery, servitude and forced 
labour. Also see Art. 44 that provides that Art. 24 and 25 are absolute rights. 
168
 See Rome Statute Art. 7 (1) (a)-(k). 
169
 Werle (2009: 346, Marginal n 929). 
170
 Werle (2009:346 Marginal n 929 et seq). 
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 Art 6(b). 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
Section 2 of the GCA criminalises the grave breaches articles of the four Geneva Conventions.
172
  
However, Section 9 of the ICC Act also criminalises war crimes by incorporating totally Article 
8 of the Rome Statute, which, inter alia, contains provisions on grave breaches as stipulated 
under Section 2 of the GCA.
173
 Therefore, it can be stated that the war crimes provision under 
the ICC Act, broadens the criminal jurisdiction of war crimes to include: an improved list on 
grave breaches;
174
 serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions;
175
 
serious violation of laws and customs applicable in both international armed conflict and armed 
conflict not of an international character.
176
 The ICC Act actually expresses this by the proviso 
that its provision on war crimes does not affect or limit the operation of Section 2 of the GCA as 
discussed above. This means that the two laws are to be applied in tandem.  
4.4.1.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, in giving force to crimes under the Rome Statute, Uganda has adopted the crime 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes by completely copying the provision of the 
Rome Statute. Therefore, one can state that Uganda has made a great stride in implementing the 
Rome Statute in as far as that it is possible to punish international core crimes in Uganda as . 
                                                     
 
172
  See Arts 50, 51, 130, 147 of Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and IV respectively (Grave breaches involves the 
following acts if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or 
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body 
or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried 
out unlawfully and wantonly). 
Note that In light of the complementarity regime, the GCA was for the first time invoked in 2010, in an attempt 
to prosecute one Thomas Kwoyelo, a former low level commander in the Lord‟s Resistance Army. The non-
retroactivity principle prevented invoking the provisions of the ICC Act. Cf. Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo alias 
Latoni No. 02/10 (amended indictment). 
173
 See Rome Statute, Art. 8 (i)-(iv). 
174
 Rome Statue, Art 8 (2) (v)-(vii).  
175
 Rome Statute, Art 8 (2) (c). Article 3, Common to the Geneva Conventions is specifically in respect to conflict 
not of an international character. Cf. Geneva Conventions 1949. 
176
 Rome Statute, Art 8(2) (a) and (e).  
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4.4.2 Principles of jurisdiction 
The exercise of legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction is an important part of state 
sovereignty.
177
 The ICC therefore, provides for a mechanism where states are actually 
encouraged to use their sovereignty.
178
 The Rome Statute reaffirms the international criminal law 
principle that it is the duty of States to exercise criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes.
179
 Failure by States to do so warrants the ICC to invoke the 
complementarity principle in the context of admissibility.
180
 
 Jurisdiction by Ugandan courts to punish international core crimes was only provided for 
under the Geneva Conventions Act, which provides for universal jurisdiction over commission 
of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
181
  Section 2(g) of the ICC Act states that the 
purpose of the Act is to give Ugandan courts jurisdiction over persons who commit crimes under 
the ICC Act. Section 18 of the ICC Act grants extra territorial jurisdiction to courts over the 
offences listed under sections 7-16 of the Act.
182
  
Distinct from the Geneva Conventions Act that grants universal jurisdiction, the ICC Act 
provision on jurisdiction highlights circumstances under which Ugandan courts may exercise 
jurisdiction with regards to the punishment of the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. The section stipulates that, if an act has been committed outside Uganda, 
Ugandan courts shall have jurisdiction not only on the basis of active and passive nationality 
jurisdiction,
183
 but also, if a person is employed by Uganda in a civilian or military capacity, and 
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 Cryer (2005: 986). 
178
 Cryer (2005: 986) quoted from Clapham, „Issues of Complexity, Complicity and Complementarity: From the 
Nuremberg Trials to the Dawn of the International Criminal Court’, in Nuremberg. 
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 Preamble, Para 6.  
180
 Preamble, Para 10, Art 1 and Art 17. Also see Schabas (2010: 171-193). 
181
 Geneva Convention Act, Sec 2. 
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 International crimes (Secs. 7, 8 and 9), and offences against the administration of justice (Sec 10-16).  
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 See generally Shaw (2011) Chapter 12 on Criminal Jurisdiction. 
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if the person after the commission of the offence is present in Uganda.  This means that the 
perpetrator does not have to be a Ugandan, what matters is that he /she is found within the 
confines of Uganda. In essence, in view of the LRA war, the ICC Act would allow for Uganda to 
initiate proceedings against LRA rebels for committing atrocities not only in Uganda, but, in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Southern Sudan by virtue of the 
fact that the LRA are citizens of Uganda. 
4.4.3 Procedure for domestic prosecution 
Commencement of criminal proceedings in Uganda is generally the reserve of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP).
184
 The ICC Act under Section 17 confers to the Constitutional 
provision and specifically directs that proceedings for international crimes be initiated with the 
consent of the DPP.
185
 Currently, within the DPP is a special unit that has been set up to 
specifically deal with international crimes. 
4.5 General principles of criminal responsibility 
In Uganda, the general principles of criminal responsibility are not harmonised in one law as laid 
down in the Rome Statute. The Ugandan ICC Act under Section 19 makes the first attempt to 
harmonise the general principles of Ugandan criminal law. However, Section 19 does not replica 
Part III of the Rome Statute. It incorporates some of the principles to be applied with 
modification. However, note that these principles as stipulated under the ICC Act have a limited 
application to the crime of genocide; crimes against humanity; and war crimes.  
                                                     
184
 Constitution, Art. 120(3) (c). However, also see Art. 120 (3) (b)(C) which by inference also allows for 
individuals or any other authority to institute criminal proceeding. Cf. Magistrates Court Act Cap 16 Laws of 
Uganda 2000, Part V on “institution of criminal proceedings”, by persons other than the DPP. 
185
 ICC Act, Secs. 7-16. Note that the draft ICC Bill, 2006 had given the mandate to the Attorney General, which 
was reconsidered by parliament to confer with Art. 120 of the Constitution that gives the mandate to the DPP; at 
Parliament of Uganda– Hansard (Wednesday, 10 March 2010: 3.02). 
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4.5.1 Principle of legality 
The idea that criminal law should deal fairly and justly with the individual is expressed in the 
principle of legality as stated in a number of maxims namely: nullum crimen sine lege; nulla 
poena sine lege; nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali.
186
 Generally, the maxims express that for 
one‟s conduct to be punished, both the conduct and the punishment must be prescribed by law. 
Further, that such prescribed offence or punishment should not be retrospectively enacted. These 
maxims have constitutionally been part of Uganda‟s legal system.187 This leaves one to assume 
that this is reason why the ICC Act in tackling the principle of legality only highlights two 
clauses within the provisions from the Rome Statute.
188
 Article 22(2), which relates to principles 
of interpretation applied to definition of crimes, to be in favour of the person being investigated, 
prosecuted and convicted, and Article 24(2) which stipulates that in case of change of law before 
judgment, favourable law shall be to a person being investigated, prosecuted and convicted. 
However, the provision on non-retroactivity of the law has poses a challenge and 
disappointment to victims and pro international criminal justice advocates who had hope that the 
ICC Act would allow for the prosecution of perpetrators of the LRA conflict from 1986 to 
date.
189
 However, Namuwese in her thesis argues that non-retroactivity principle for the case of 
Uganda cannot be pleaded with respect to international crimes,
190
 a matter to be addressed in the 
next chapter. 
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 Burchell (1970: 53). 
187
 See Art 28(7) and (12). 
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 Sec. 19 (1) (a) (ii) and (iii). 
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 See Chapter 1, Sec.1.1. 
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 See Namuwase (2011: 33). 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
 
Therefore, one can literally state that complementarity in practice for the LRA conflict 
within and out of Uganda for the post ICC era, period between 1
st
 July 2002 and 2010,  when the 
Act was enacted is not to be possible. The Act is therefore only suitable for future application. 
4.5.2 Ne bis in idem rule  
The Ne bis in idem rule or principle against double jeopardy is based on the pleas of previous 
conviction autrefois convict and previous acquittal autrefois acquit.  The ICC Act incorporates 
this principle among the provision on general principles of criminal law as opposed to its 
location under the Rome Statute.
191
 The principle of double jeopardy has been part of Uganda‟s 
domestic legal provisions. Article 28(9) of the Ugandan Constitution prohibits the trial of an 
individual for the same offence more than once, whether acquitted or convicted or for any other 
criminal offence of which, he or she could have been convicted at the trial for that offence. The 
provision however, creates an exception to waiver of the defence in cases where a superior court 
in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the conviction or acquittal has ordered a 
trial. The question, therefore, is whether national courts in Uganda would apply this to 
international decisions considering that the courts have jurisdiction to try the ICC crimes.
192
   
Perhaps, in case such an issue arose, one may invoke the Rome Statute provision, which 
in essence attempts to be true to the complementarity principle in as far as the relationship 
between the ICC and national courts are concerned in prosecuting international crimes.  In this 
provision, the principle of double jeopardy is to be invoked by the ICC in two instances: in cases 
where the ICC crimes have been prosecuted by another court; the reverse has been said to also be 
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 ICC Act, art 20. 
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 ICC Act, Sec. 7, 8 and 9. 
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true for other courts in respect to the ICC decisions on the same.
193
 However, in as much as the 
ICC Act incorporates in totality the Rome Statute provision on double jeopardy, it is my view 
that this could raise a future constitutional challenge on the matter especially considering that 
international law decisions are rather persuasive and not binding on national courts as discussed 
in chapter two of this thesis. A further argument would be that the Rome Statute seems to set the 
ICC at the pick of the hierarchy of courts in Uganda when it gives exceptions, under which the 
ICC can waive the principle of double jeopardy following decisions made by other courts, which 
could include Uganda national courts. Article 20 (3) of the ICC Act allows for the ICC to review 
decisions in instances where trials were carried on in such a way that the person was being 
shielded from criminal responsibility and that the conduct of the trial was not compatible with 
international criminal law standards.
194
 Food for thought would then be whether this provision of 
the ICC Act is inconsistent with chapter thirteen of the Constitution in as far as the hierarchy of 
courts in Uganda and their roles are concerned vis-à-vis the ICC. This therefore calls for a 
further analytical research on the application of the double jeopardy in light of the evolution of 
international criminal tribunals particularly in the ICC complementarity regime. 
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 Art. 20(2) and (3). 
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4.5.3 Criminal responsibility 
4.5.3.1 Individual criminal responsibility 
Individual criminal responsibility refers to an individual being responsible for his/her unlawful 
actions.
195
 The principle of individual criminal responsibility under international law was first 
clarified at the Nuremberg trials of the German major war criminals. It was stated that “Crimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can international law be enforced.”196 Article 25(1) of the 
Rome Statute, reaffirms the Nuremberg statement when it establishes individual responsibility 
for international core crimes. The article, under part (3) regulates the modalities of individual 
criminal responsibility and distinguishes several modes of criminal participation.
197
 The ICC 
Act, completely incorporates Article 25 of the Rome Statute, therefore, creating individual 
criminal responsibility for the international crimes incorporated under the Act.
198
 Notably, 
individual criminal responsibility had already been created for grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions in Uganda as discussed in section 4.4.1.3 above.
199
 The modes of participation 
stipulated under the Geneva Conventions Act include: the act of commission, or aiding, abetting 
or procuring the commission of an offence by another person. Therefore, the incorporation of the 
modes of participation into the ICC Act from the Rome Statute expands the scope to embrace the 
entire body of international core crimes.  
 Further, Section 19(b) allows for the application of further principles under Ugandan 
criminal law. This means that individual criminal responsibility can be attributed to an individual 
                                                     
195
 Damgaard (2010: 12). 
196
 International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Goring et al Judgment of 1 October 1946. 
197
 Werle (2009:168). 
198
 Art 19(1) (a) (iv). 
199
 Geneva Conventions Act, Sec 2(1). 
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on grounds of conspiracy.
200
 This component is not included under the modes of participation 
under the Rome Statute, but, is among the inchoate offences under the Uganda Penal Code 
Act.
201
  
4.5.3.2 Exclusion of jurisdiction over persons under 18years 
The ICC Act, Section 19(1) (5), incorporates Article 26 Rome Statute that prevents the courts 
from having jurisdiction over a person who committed one of the international core crimes while 
he/she was under the age of 18 years.
202
 This is contrary to various domestic provisions on the 
criminal responsibility of children. Section 88 of the Children Act
203
 puts the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility at 12 years. Section 89, further, provides for the procedure for the arrest 
and charge of a child and states among others that no child shall be detained with an adult 
person. This corresponds with the Constitutional provision under Article 34(6). The Trial on 
Indictment Act provides for a special procedure to be taken in lieu of a sentence of death on 
person under 18 years.
204
 The unevenness in application of the law, created by the ICC Act is 
being challenged in the petition filed before the Constitutional Court in the case of Jowaad 
Kazaala vs the Attorney General.
205
 The petitioner alleges that the ICC Act provision is 
discriminatory. Though the matter is sub judice, it is my opinion that regard should be given to 
                                                     
200
 See discussion on Genocide, Sec 4.4.1.1 above. 
201
 See Sec.4.4.1.1 above. 
202
 During the debate of the ICC Bill, a concern was raised that this provision vis-à-vis Article 8 (2)(b) of the Rome 
Statute that makes it an offence for a person to enlist children under the age of 15 to take part in hostilities, 
creates an opportunity for children between 16 and 17 years to be enlisted to take part in hostilities without the 
enlisters committing crimes and the children not being criminally responsible for their actions; See Parliament of 
Uganda-Hansad (10 March 2010: 6-7). 
203
 Cap 56, Laws of Uganda (2000). 
204
 Sec 10, Cap 23, Laws of Uganda (2000). 
205
 Quoted from, Mbazira (2010:218). 
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the nature in which children get involved in international crimes.
206
 The LRA conflict was of 
such nature in which children were abducted and forced to commit grave atrocities.
207
 
4.5.3.3 Responsibility of commanders and other superiors 
Responsibility of commanders and other superiors under Article 28 of the Rome Statute is linked 
to the fact that the ICC only tries those who hold the greatest responsibility.
208
 For Uganda, the 
criminal responsibility attributed to commanders and superiors is under section 19(1) (a) (vi) of 
the ICC Act. Prior to the ICC Act, remedy for acts committed by commanders or superiors in the 
normal course of duty lay in civil law for damages against the Attorney General. This did not 
include acts by non-state actors. 
This provision is, therefore, vital to attributing responsibility in the Greater Northern 
Uganda conflict. The Pre-Trial Chamber II in issuing an arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and his 
cohorts, cites the status of the relevant individuals as commanders with respect to participation in 
the conflict under Article 25 (3) (b) of the Rome Statute.
209
  
4.5.4 Dealing with bars to prosecution 
On this subject, the findings are limited to three components that would prevent the prosecution 
of international core crimes. They include: immunity for officials, amnesty/pardon and statute of 
limitation.  
                                                     
206
 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I judgment of 14 March 2012, paras 607-618. 
207
 See ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Warrant of arrest for Joseph Kony, ICC-02/04-01/05-53  13-10-2005, Count 5 and 
Count 13. 
208
 Cf. Rome Statute, Art. 25 on establishing individual criminal responsibility modes of participation. 
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 Warrants of Arrest for Joseph Kony, Vicent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/05  
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4.5.4.1 Irrelevance of official capacity  
Irrelevance of official capacity is under the Rome Statute is synonymous with the term 
immunity.
210
 Immunity has its ancient roots in international law.
211
 Developing from customary 
international law, into conventional and treaty international law,
212
 immunity allows for an 
accused to evade prosecution for criminal offences.
213
 The defence of immunity under 
international law is raised either on grounds of ratione materie or ratione personae.
214
 However, 
with the evolution of international criminal justice on the subject of disregard for immunity for 
international core crimes, jurisprudence by courts indicates that there remains discourse on this 
subject.
215
  The international community of states also remains divided on the question.  This has 
been evident with the ICC warrants of arrest for seating Head of State of Sudan Omar Hassan Al 
Bashir continues to be a contentious one.
 216
 
                                                     
210
 See Rome Statute, Art. 27. 
211
 Gevers (2011) Immunity and the Implementation Legislation in South Africa, Kenya and Uganda; quoted from 
Cryer (2007: 422) An introduction to international criminal law and procedure. 
212
 Murungu (2010: 36). 
213
 Cf. decisions in Regina v. Evans and another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and others 
(appellants)ex parte Pinochet(respondent) (on appeal from a divisional court of the queen's bench division)on 24 
March 1999(herein after ex parte Pinochet); DRC v. Belgium, ICJ Judgement of 14 February 2002; available at 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf> (accessed 29 September 2012). 
214
 Murungu (2010: 42). 
215
 In ex parte Pinochet, the House of Lords held in Appeal decision 3 that immunity for incumbent head of state is 
absolute. In the post-Pinochet case, the Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, the International Court of 
Justice held that Incumbent state officials are immune from criminal trials abroad regardless of the severity of the 
charges. However, in the joint separate opinions of Judge Rosalyn Higgins, Judge Koijmans and Buergenthal 
argued that though they agreed with the majority ruling, „[the growing international consensus on the need to 
punish crimes regarded as most heinous by the international community, indicate that the warrant for the arrest 
did not as such violate international law] available at <http://www.paclii.org/journals/fJSPL/vol07no1/4.shtml> 
(accessed 30 September 2012). 
  Conversely, the Special Court for Sierra Leone held in the case of Prosecutor v. Charles Gghankay Taylor 
SCSL-2003-01-I, that the official position of the Applicant as an incumbent Head of State at the time when 
criminal proceedings were initiated against him was not a bar to his prosecution by the court. The Applicant was 
therefore subject to criminal proceedings before the Court. The applicant had been charged with committing 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.  
216
 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-1 04-03-2009 and ICC-02/05-01/09-95 12-
07-2010. See Aceng (2011) “African States Parties to the ICC at crossroads” in The Forum The ICC and Africa 
Issue 2 at p 24-26. 
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 In Uganda, the question of immunity is said to be one of the reasons that stalled the passing 
of the ICC Act;
217
 the intricacies are discussed below.  
 Article 27 of the Rome Statute disregards immunity for prosecution of international 
crimes with emphasis on the irrelevance of official capacity of Head of State or Government, a 
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official. The 
article further states that immunity shall not be considered for the reduction of sentence.  
 The Uganda ICC Act is silent on this particular provision. One would then posit that 
since in defining the crimes, the ICC act refers to, “[a] person”, by implication, this would 
include all persons covered under Article 27 of the Rome Statute. However, such an argument 
would not hold for the Head of State, in light of Article 98(4) of the Uganda Constitution that 
exempts the Ugandan Head of State from liability in criminal proceedings in any court. The ICC 
Act in this context would be null and void according to Article 2(2) of the Constitution.
218
 In the 
case of Prof. Gilbert Baliseka Bukenya vs The Attorney General,
219
 the Constitutional Court 
confirmed the Constitutional provision on immunity of the Head of State. The Court stated that 
that Article 98(4) is the exclusive preserve of the Head of State, Head of Government and 
Commander-in- Chief of the People‟s Defence Forces and Fountain of Honour.  
 However, the research reveals that it was not the intention of the Parliament to exclude 
the provision on irrelevance of official capacity from the ICC Act. The debate in Parliament 
reveals that parliament agreed to retain Clause 25 of the ICC Bill, which provided for irrelevance 
                                                     
217
 See Parliament of Uganda– Hansard (Wednesday, 10 March 2010) para. 3.22, 4.11, 4.18, and 2nd reading debate 
clause 25. Also see “Ugandan parliament may pass bill that will challenge President's immunity”; available at 
<http://humanrightshouse.org/noop/page.php?p=Articles/1040.html&print=1> (accessed 29 September, 2012). 
218
 It states that any law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is null and void to the extent of its inconsistence. 
219
 Constitutional Petition No. 30 of 2011. 
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of official capacity.
220
 This raises food for thought as to why the provision was excluded in the 
published ICC Act.  
 It worth noting that the absence of Article 27 in the ICC Act would only favour the 
Ugandan Head of State as explicitly provided by the Constitution, and not any other 
individuals.
221
 As to whether, foreign nationals can raise this defence while before Ugandan 
courts, is left to be addressed by the broad base of the immunity question under international 
law.
222
  
 Further, to note is that, Section 25 of the ICC Act, rejects official capacity of a person as 
a bar to request for surrender or assistance made by the ICC.
223
 The interpretation with the prior 
submission would be that, the Ugandan Head of State cannot be tried before Ugandan Courts as 
stated in Article 98(4) of the Constitution, but, under this provision, he/she could be transferred 
to the ICC, which will be hardly practicable. However, on a positive note, pleading ratione 
personae or ratione materie will not suffice for other individuals including Heads of States from 
other jurisdictions. One could therefore state that the Ugandan law would allow for the arrest and 
surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, against whom the ICC has issued warrants of 
arrest, if he was found present in Uganda.
224
  
                                                     
220
 Cf. Parliament of Uganda– Hansard (Wednesday, 10 March 2010) debate on clause 25 of the ICC Bill on 
irrelevance of official capacity at p. 26-27.   
221
 See the case of Uganda vs Akbar Hussein Godi, Criminal case No. 124 of 2008 where a former Member of 
Parliament who while serving as a Member of Parliament, was charged with murder and sentenced to 25 years in 
prison. Also see the case of Prof. Gilbert Baliseka Bukenya vs The Attorney General No.30/11. 
222
 Refer to Sec. 4.4.2 of this chapter on jurisdiction. 
223
 (1) The existence of any immunity or special procedural rule attaching to the official capacity of any person is not 
a ground for- 
(a) refusing or postponing the execution of a request for surrender or other assistance by the ICC; 
(b) holding that a person is ineligible for arrest or surrender to the ICC under this Act; or 
(c) holding that a person is not obliged to provide the assistance sought in request by the ICC. 
224
 See The Prosecutor v. Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, First arrest warrant issued 4 March 2009, and second arrest 
warrant issued 12 July 2010; available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc0205010
9/icc02050109> (accessed 14 October, 2012). 
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4.5.4.2 The question of pardon/amnesty 
Article 29 (10) of the Uganda Constitution prohibits the trial for a criminal offence for which one 
has been pardoned. Therefore, grant of pardon exonerates one from prosecution and punishment 
in respect to the said offence for which one was pardoned. Pardon within the confines of the 
Ugandan law includes prerogative of mercy granted by the President under Article 121(4) (a) of 
the Constitution, and then the grant of amnesty. However, the subject for discussion will only 
delve into the question of amnesty as a bar to prosecution since prerogative of mercy is only 
available to one who has already been convicted.
225
  
 Amnesty is considered a form of immunity because it bars any future prosecutions 
against the person for whom amnesty has been given.
226
 It is wider than pardon, which merely 
relives the offender from punishment.
227
 The justices of the Constitutional Court in the case of 
Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo
228
 concurred with the applicant‟s argument that amnesty under the 
Amnesty Act was a form of pardon recognised by the Constitution.
 
However, precedents from 
regional courts and criminal tribunals detach amnesties from international core crimes.
229
  
                                                     
225
 Cf.< http://oxforddictionaries.com> (accessed 29 August 2012); prerogative of mercy refers to the right and 
power of a sovereign, state president, or other supreme authority to commute a death sentence, to change the 
mode of execution, or to pardon an offender thereby relieving the defendant of all the consequences of 
conviction. In Kooky Sharma and Anor vs Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No.44/2000. The appellant 
was convicted for murder and sentenced to death by the Supreme Court, however, in March 2012, he was 
granted presidential pardon available at 
<http://www.newvision.co.ug/article/fullstory.aspx?story_id=629895&catid=1&mid=53> (accessed 29 August 
2012). 
226
 Amnesty Act, Sec 1(a). defines amnesty to mean “a pardon, forgiveness, exemption or discharge from criminal 
prosecution or any other form of punishment by a State. 
227
 Oxford Dictionary of Law (2003: 25). Also see Prosecutor v. Moris Kallon and another, Case No. SCSL-2004-
15/16-AR72 (E); Judgment of 13 March, 2004, para. 66 for further definitions on amnesty. 
228
 Constitutional Petition No. 36/2011 (Reference) (unreported) lines 480-495. 
229
 Almonacid-Arellano et al. vs Chile Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 26 September, 2006, 
Paras 107-110; Prosecutor vs Moris Kallon and another, Case No. SCSL-2004-15/16-AR72 (E), Judgment of 13 
March, 2004, paras 67, 71 and 74.  
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 From the year 2000 to May 2012, the Amnesty Act made it possible for reporters who 
renounced rebel activity to be granted amnesty.
230
 Amnesty could be applied for at any stage,
231
 
irrespective of the offence committed.
232
 Such a provision made it possible for other senior 
perpetrators of the LRA conflict to apply for and be granted amnesty,
233
 even after, it was 
established by the ICC that the crimes perpetrated during the LRA conflict consisted of the 
international core crimes of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
234
 The amnesty law, 
therefore, was until May 2012, a challenge for possible prosecution of even the top LRA 
leadership wanted by the ICC. Although section 2A of the Act, allowed the Minister
235
 by 
Statutory instrument, with the approval of Parliament to declare persons not eligible for grant of 
amnesty, the Minister throughout the span of the Act, never made any such exemptions.
236
 This 
used to probe questions whether the top LRA commanders wanted by the ICC would have been 
granted amnesty had they applied.
237
 One can state that the decision would have been a rather 
contentious one subject to legal battles. It would be so, first, considering that the enactment of 
the amnesty law was a desperate move by the Government to end mainly the Greater Northern 
                                                     
230
 Amnesty Act, Sec 2 and 3. Also see Sec. 1,“Reporter” is defined as any person seeking to be granted amnesty.  
231
 See Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo Alias Latoni No. 36/2011where it was indicated that the accused applied for 
amnesty after being captured and while in custody awaiting trial. 
232
 Amnesty Act, Sec 2(2), prohibited prosecution and punishment upon any person to whom amnesty has been 
granted for participation in the war or rebellion or for any crime committed in the cause of the war or armed 
rebellion.  
233
 See Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo, No. 36/2011, affidavit in support of reference, para 6, 11 and 12 on Senior 
LRA commanders captured by the UPDF who were granted amnesty-Brig Kenneth Banya (2004) and Brig. Sam 
Kolo (2005). 
234
Available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/situation%20index?lan=en-
GB> (accessed 30 September 2012). 
235
 Amnesty Act, Sec 1, “Minister” means, Minister responsible for Internal Affairs.  
236
 The provision to allow the Minister to exempt from amnesty was included in the Amnesty Act by the Amnesty 
(Amendment) Act, 2006, an Act to amend the Amnesty Act, Cap 294. This was a move carefully and 
conveniently done subsequent to the unsealed arrest warrants for the top LRA commanders issued by the ICC in 
October 2005. Uganda was also at this time having peace talks with the LRA; the famous Juba Peace 
Agreements that collapsed in November 2008. 
237
 See list of ICC indicted LRA commanders; available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/situation%20index?lan=en-
GB> (accessed 19 September 2012). 
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Ugandan war. The intention of the Amnesty Act was to discourage rebel activity, particularly 
those involved in the LRA war to freely surrender without fear of being prosecuted.
238
 Secondly, 
in light of the Amnesty Act, the rebels were free to apply for amnesty and be granted. Thirdly, 
the Constitutional Court ruling in the case of Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo alias latoni provides 
the tip of the iceberg of how the courts would have approached the issue. The Justices of the 
Court, subject to the Amnesty Act and Constitution, ordered that the trial Court stop the trial of 
the applicant, who was charged with committing grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions 
Act and Penal Code Act offences. The Court further ordered that the Directorate of Public 
Prosecution and the Amnesty Commission grant the applicant amnesty. The Court disregarded 
any precedents presented by the respondent with respect to the international law position on 
amnesty for international core crimes.
239
 Perhaps this position will be settled by the Supreme 
Court in a pending appeal filed in the case of Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni on the 
question of the Amnesty Act as it then was vis-à-vis the prosecution for international core crimes 
in Uganda. 
Positive to note is that the Amnesty Act expired on 25 May 2012.
 240
 Despite the 
discretion the Minister had to extend the Act, he extended the span of the Act to the exclusion of 
provisions of part II of the Amnesty Act, which refers to the application for and grant of 
Amnesty.
241
 This has been a milestone for advocates against amnesty and pro prosecution of ICC 
crimes. It means therefore that for now, there is clear path for prosecuting perpetrators of 
international crimes in particular the LRA.  
                                                     
238
 Cf. Constitutional Petition No. 36/2011 lines 510-535. 
239
 See discussion in Chapter 3, Sec. 3.4.6 above. 
240
 See the Amnesty Act (Extension of Expiry Period) Instrument, No. 2010 that extended the span of the Amnesty 
Act for 24 months beginning 25
th
 May, 2010. 
241
 Available at <http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/631450-no-more-amnesty-r-lra-rebels-as-law-expires.html> 
(accessed 30 September 2012). 
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4.5.4.3 Statute of limitations 
Article 19(1) (a) (vii) of the ICC Act, restates Article 29 of the Rome Statute on statute of 
limitations. It is to the effect that the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
shall not be subject to statute of limitations. This confers with Uganda‟s penal laws, which as a 
general rule, do not allow for statute of limitations. Even then, offences that Section 28 of the 
Penal Code Act allows for the application of the statute of limitations period do not include 
offences within the scope of the crimes under the ICC Act.  
4.5.4.4 Defences 
Defences are used to denote all grounds for which, for one reason or another hinder the 
sanctioning of a criminal charge.
242
 The Rome Statute makes provision for procedural defences 
to be raised or considered by the Court to exempt one charged with crimes under the Rome 
Statute from criminal responsibility. Articles 31 “[g]rounds for excluding criminal 
responsibility” provides a list of grounds namely: insanity; involuntary intoxication; self defence 
or defence of others or, in case of war crimes, defence of property; duress and necessity. Other 
grounds are listed in the subsequent Articles. Articles 32 and 33 are in regard to mistake of fact 
and law, and superior orders and prescription of law respectively.  Some these listed do not differ 
from the already existent list of general defences stipulated under the Uganda Penal Code Act: 
Mistake of fact (Section 9); Insanity (Section 11); Intoxication (Section 12); and the defence of 
person and property (Section 15). The ICC Act under Section 19(1) (a) (ix), (x) and (xi) 
nevertheless adopts the defences as provided for in Articles 31-33 of the Rome Statute, thereby 
including what the Penal Code does not provide for. 
                                                     
242
 Schabas (2010:226). 
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The defence of superior orders is not appreciated by courts in Uganda.
243
 Other defences under 
the ICC Statute contained in other provisions include: abandonment and prevention (Article 25 
(3) (f)) and exclusion of jurisdiction of persons under 18 (Article 26). These have been 
incorporated under Section 19 (1) (iv) and (v) of the ICC Act. 
 However, the Rome Statute further permits for the Court to consider applying other 
defences that have not been codified by the Statute guided by the provisions of Article 21.
244
 
Article 21states that: 
 “[The Court shall apply: 
(b)…where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;  
(c)… general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the 
world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and 
with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.]” 
 
With this provision, in particular Article part (c), other general principles excluding criminal 
responsibility stipulated by the Uganda Penal Code Act and those established by precedent could 
be considered by the court during proceedings.
245
  Section 19(1) (b) of the ICC Act, further, 
allows for a person when charged with genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, to 
rely on any justifiable excuse or defence available under the laws of Uganda or under 
international law.    
 However, Section 19(3) provides that, in case of a conflict between the Rome Statute 
defence provisions and those stipulated under section 19(b), the former shall prevail. 
                                                     
243
 Uganda vs A1.Hh/g no. 2324 Sgt Lukecha Justine, A2. H/g Pte Opira Tula and A3. H/g no. 3222 PteOokwera 
Simon Case No: HCT-02-CR-SC-0039 OF 2003(Unreported). 
244
 Article 31(3). 
245
 Penal Code Act: Claim of right (Sec. 7); Intention and motive (Sec. 8); Compulsion (Sec. 14); Defence of rash, 
reckless and negligent acts (Sec.15); Use of force in effecting arrest (Sec. 16); Compulsion by husband (Sec. 17). 
For the defence of Alibi, the burden rests on the prosecution to disprove the defence put up by the accused as 
decide in Uganda vs George Kasya [1988-1990] HCB 48. Cf. Vincent Rwamwaro vs Uganda, High Court. 
Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 1988. 
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 It can be stated that the provision on the accused‟s right to raise a defence under Article 67(e) of 
the Rome Statute has greatly been complied with.  
4.6 Penalty and sentencing 
Defining punishment for a crime that has been established is a rule under the principle of legality 
maxim nulla poena sine lege.
246
 Both the Rome Statute and Ugandan Constitution confer to this 
principle.  
Article 77 of the Rome Statute provides for the penalty of person found guilty of 
committing the international core crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. A person may 
receive a sentence of imprisonment for specified number of years, which may not exceed a 
maximum of 30 years [Article 77(1) (a)]; or imprisonment for life in exceptional circumstances 
[Article 77(2) (b)]. Other possible penalties are a fine, and forfeiture of proceeds, property and 
assets derived directly or indirectly from that crime [Article 77(2) (a) and (b)]. The ICC Act 
prescribes the penalty for the similar crimes as imprisonment for life or a lesser term.
247
  This 
provision of the ICC Act in stipulating lesser penalty for offences that would otherwise at the 
discretion of the Court, carry the death penalty under the Ugandan law becomes debatable.
248
  
The question would have been, whether Article 80 of the Rome Statute accommodates 
the national provision. This is because the article allows for states to impose penalties as 
prescribed by national laws even where the law of the State does not provide for penalties as 
prescribed by the Statute. At the drafting of the Statute, it was not the intention of the drafters to 
                                                     
246
 Burchell (1983:53). 
247
 Articles 7(3), 8(3) and 9(3). 
248
 Uganda‟s penal law allows for punishment up to the death penalty for the offences of murder (Sec 188 and189, 
Penal code Act), rape (sec 124, Penal code Act). Also see the Magistrates Courts (Amendment), Act, 2007 for 
the death penalty for aggravated defilement. These offences are, inter alia, common to some of the predicate 
crimes contained within the Rome Statute. Cf. the Rome Statute, Article 6(a), Article 7(a) and (g), Article 8(2) 
(a)(i) and 2(c)(i). 
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include the death penalty since the death penalty violates the right to life and is a form of torture 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment therefore, going against the human 
rights standards upon which the Rome Statute was being founded.
249
  Similarly, parliament of 
Uganda was aware of the Constitutional provision on the death penalty,
250
 but, opted not to 
include it in the ICC Act because it was not in line with Art 77(1) (b) of the Rome Statute.
251
 
However, one must note that such variances in punishment for similar offences under the 
ICC Act vis-à-vis the other penal provisions on the same offences will definitely create 
discrepancy.  The basis being that Article 21 of the Constitution calls of equality before and 
under the law. Further, Article 22 of the Constitution allows for one‟s life to be taken away in 
execution of a sentence passed in a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of a 
criminal offence under the laws of Uganda and the conviction and sentence have been confirmed 
by the highest appellate court. In the case of Attorney General vs Susan Kigula and 417 
others
252
, the Supreme Court confirmed that the death penalty is not unconstitutional, save for 
the fact that it is imposed at the Court‟s discretion. Therefore, the fact that one is liable to suffer 
death under one law while under another to suffer life imprisonment or lesser term for similar 
offences creates a possible constitutional question.  
 
 
                                                     
249
 Arts 3 and 6, UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
250
 Constitution, Art 22(1). 
251
 See Parliament of Uganda-Hansad (Wednesday, 10 March 2010) at p. 23 and 24. Clause 8 sub-clause 3(a) on 
crimes against humanity and Clause 9 sub-clause 3(a) on war crimes of the ICC Bill contained provisions on the 
death penalty, which parliament agreed to amend to confer with Article 77(1)(b) of the Rome Statute.  
252
 Supreme Court-Constitutional Appeal No. 03 OF 2006 (Unreported). 
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4.7 Conclusion  
The analysis of the chapter reveals that Uganda has to a great extent implemented the substantive 
provisions of Rome Statute to allow effective prosecution and punishment of the international 
core crimes. This is not only with regards to directly importing into ICC Act the crimes as they 
are stipulated in the Rome Statute, but also adopts other provisions of the Rome Statute to some 
extent in tandem with other domestic laws.  This is to allow for the effective prosecution and 
punishment of the international core crimes in compliance with the Rome Statute. The Act 
contains special provisions on prosecution and exercise of jurisdiction for these crimes. The 
latter gives the national courts extensive jurisdiction over the international core crimes 
committed within and outside Uganda. However, the biggest setback in the ICC Act is the non 
inclusion of irrelevance of official capacity.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Summary of research findings 
Chapter one sets the pace by establishing the relationship between the ICC and Uganda. This is 
important because it justifies Uganda‟s obligation to implement the Rome Statute provisions. For 
Uganda the most pressing being the need to enable accountability for the atrocities committed 
during the Greater Northern Ugandan Conflict both at the ICC and in Uganda.  
Chapter two addresses the concept of implementation of international treaties. It is 
established that the nature of international criminal law, whether or not it subscribes to dualism 
or monism, a State in implementing the substantive provisions of international criminal law  may 
opt either implement by incorporation or by non-incorporation and instead choose to apply 
ordinary criminal law.
253
 However, if a State chooses to implement by incorporation, then the 
State may choose to either amend the existing criminal legislation or enact a new law. 
 The chapter three reveals that international law becomes part of Ugandan law through 
enacting implementing legislation and by courts setting precedence. However, in light of the case 
of Thomas Kwoyelo, courts do not seem to appreciate the principles of international criminal law 
even when they are conflict with domestic law.  Therefore, enactment remains somewhat the 
most available option of implementation of international law. However, whatever law that is 
enacted must not be inconsistent with the Ugandan Constitution, because that law will be 
considered null and void to the extent of its inconsistency.
254
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 See Chapter 2, Sec. 4.2.2 above. 
254
 See Chapter 3, Sec. 3.2.1 above. 
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Chapter four in examining the progress and challenges of implementing the Rome Statute 
in Uganda establishes that Uganda has made great progress domesticating a Rome Statute 
implementing legislation, the ICC Act. In mainly dealing with the substantive provisions of the 
Rome Statute, this paper, in this chapter, reveals that Uganda has comprehensively implemented 
the Rome Statute provisions to allow for effective prosecution and punishment of international 
core crimes. The Act completely incorporates the crimes by copying the provisions of the Rome 
Statute. The Act also incorporates to a great extent the general principles of criminal law under 
the Rome Statute with necessary modification. In a nutshell, the research analysis reveals that the 
existing domestic legal frameworks prior to the ICC Act would have hardly accommodated the 
effective performance of Uganda‟s duty to prosecute and punish obligations under the Rome 
Statute. The analysis also reveals challenges that present.  Lack of inclusion of a provision of 
irrelevance of official capacity
255
 is a weakness of the Act that presents for implementing the 
Rome Statute. Threats to the Act from prior established domestic laws are also pointed in the 
analysis. These will affect the possible implementation of the Act because variances in 
application of the law is created, which would possibly probe constitutional interpretation.   
5.2 Concluding Remarks 
It is evident that a State that ratifies an international agreement consents to be bound by 
obligations created by the treaty.
256
 However, the evolution of international criminal law creates 
even a far greater obligation for States to oblige. This follows the internationally developed norm 
that States have the primary responsibility to prosecute international crimes.
 257
  The provisions 
on the principles of complementarity and co-operation under the Rome Statute hardly leave any 
                                                     
255
 See Chapter 4, Sec. 3.5.5.1. 
256
 See Vienna Convention, Art. 2(1)(b) and Art. 14. 
257
 See Rome Statute, Preamble, Para 4 and 6. 
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option for a country like Uganda that has been engulfed in conflict characterised by the 
commission of international core crimes not to enact a statute implementing the Rome Statute. 
Basing on the study focus, one can state that Uganda in adhering to the complementarity 
principle has substantially complied with the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute, which 
will ensure adequate prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of international core crimes. 
What remains to be seen is the how courts will deal with the challenges discussed in the paper, 
when in their midst. It is hoped that the case of Jowaad Kazaala vs Attorney General No. 24/ 
2010  will set a landmark when decided upon by the Uganda Constitutional Court.  
5.3 Observations and possible recommendations  
5.3.1 Absence of provision on irrelevance of official capacity  
This sets a draw back to the purpose of not only the Act, but the foundations for criminal justice. 
Statistics from the situations before the ICC, involve indictments for Heads of States considered 
to bare the greatest responsibility for international core crimes committed.
258
 The war in 
Northern Uganda involved not only the LRA but also the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces, 
whom the communities in Uganda claim committed atrocities in Uganda.
259
 Subject to the 
principle of command responsibility under the Rome Statute,
260
 it would then be possible to 
attribute the atrocities committed to the commander in Chief of the Uganda armed forces who is 
the President.
261
 Therefore, not including the provision of official capacity can be perceived as 
applying the law selectively.  Since the research established that Parliament enacted the ICC Act 
                                                     
258
 Indictment for Omar Hassan Al Bashir of Sudan, Laurant Gbagbo of Ivory Cost, Muammar Gadaffi of Libya 
(now deceased); available at<http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/> (accessed 23 October 
2012). 
259
 See HURINET-U, NPWJ and UCICC, Pre Review Conference States Delegates Visit Report (2010); available at 
<http://www.npwj.org/sites/default/files/documents/DelegatesVisitsReport%20FINAL%2017DEC10.pdf> 
(accessed 23 October 2012). 
260
 See Rome Statute, Art. 28. Also see Chapter 4, Sec. 3.5.3.3.  
261
 See Chapter 4, Sec.4.5.4.1. 
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with the provision on irrelevance of official capacity present, a move to amend the ICC Act can 
still be brought forth. Also, consideration to amend the Constitution should be thought to include 
this provision as an exception to Article 98(4). This should be done with the notion that leaders 
are not expected to get involved in such international core crimes and if they do, then they should 
be held accountable.  
5.3.2 Possible constitutional challenges
262
 
The main threats to implementing the ICC Act are the variances established between the Act and 
other provisions in domestic legislation. First, are concerns raised about certain provisions of the 
ICC Act being inconsistent with domestic laws. Among these are: no death penalty for acts of 
murder under the ICC Act, which is otherwise stipulated under the Penal Code Act for the same 
offence; and no prosecution for acts committed while one is below the age of 18, yet other 
domestic laws indicate that criminal liability is possible for children under 18years. Secondly, 
are provisions that are directly inconsistent with the Constitution, for instance the ne bis in idem 
rule which impliedly places the ICC as the highest Court, contrary to the Constitutional provision 
on hierarchy of courts in Uganda. To streamline the application of these provisions to avoid 
future technicalities, the constitutional challenges can be brought before the Uganda 
Constitutional Court to let the court rule on the issues. 
 
                                                     
262
 See petition by Jowaad Kazaala vs the Attorney General 24 of 2010, where the petitioner challenges a number of 
provisions of the ICC Act as being inconsistent with the Constitution. 
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5.3.3 Non-retrospective application of the ICC Act  
The fact that the ICC Act is subject to the Uganda Constitution provision on non-retroactivity of 
the Law means that the ICC Act is reserved for a future rather than current application with 
respect to accountability of the LRA conflict. This therefore, defeats the whole underlying 
purpose for which those who lobbied for a Rome Statute implementing law had thought. The 
non-retroactivity of the law principle defeats the whole purpose of the Act in light of the LRA 
committed atrocities vis-à-vis the principle of complementarity.  It can however, be argued that 
in as much as the principle is appreciated in law, it can be exempted in certain instances. The 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which, although recorgnises the non-
retroactive principle, also allows for retroactive prosecution and punishment of any person for 
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognised by the community of nations.
263
  Namuwase
264
 contends that 
wording of the Ugandan Constitution on the Principle of legality subscribes to the international 
version of the principle of legality that is affiliated to international crimes as opposed to the 
national version. The international version does not require that a written law be in place as 
opposed to the national version that requires a written law. This posits that since Uganda had 
ratified the Rome Statute and the ICCPR, the principles and crimes automatically fell within the 
jurisdiction of Ugandan Courts. Such an argument would therefore, suggest that the principle of 
non-retroactivity for the ICC Act can be waived.  However, this reverts back to the realities 
established in Chapter 3 on the question of international law being part of the domestic legal 
order in Uganda and the attitude of judges who will need to be enlightened on this development.   
 
                                                     
263
 ICCPR Art. 15. 
264
 See Namuwase generally (2011). 
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5.3.4 Engaging judges  
Chapter three on sources of criminal law in Uganda points out the fact that precedents by the 
courts of record form part of sources of law. However, as revealed, the Courts in their first 
encounter with a case of international criminal nature,
265
 differed from the international criminal 
principles in favour of the domestic grant of amnesty.
266
 This was irrespective of the fact that the 
accused was facing charges of grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions Act.
267
 This can be 
attributed to the fact that the justices do not appreciate the foundations of international criminal 
law particularly international core crimes. It is important that trainings are held on a roll in basis 
for members of the entire judiciary and not limited to judges of the Special Division-The 
International Crimes Division, established to try international crimes. This should be considered, 
owing to the fact that first, judicial officers are often transferred, meaning it is possible to have a 
novel mind handling a case one finds. Secondly, is the possible that an appeal may lie from the 
International Crimes Division to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Thirdly, constitutional 
petitions on international crimes may be lodged and as such, the justices need to appreciate the 
principles of international criminal law. 
Word count is 17995 excluding bibliography 
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 See Chapter 4, Sec. 4.5.5.2. 
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